A response I wrote to this kind of two state hopium in the Israeli Democracy Global WhatsApp chat I belong to is relevant here. Both, of course, put the onus on Israel to make one more in a long chain of land for peace policy pivots. The western powers pressuring to try just one more time the empirically verified failure of the land for peace formula. Mookie advocates hopium similar to the wishful thinking about what Palestinians want expressed by one of our members in quoting this Washington Institute piece from 2021:

“While not recent, I bring this article here only to make the point that the relations between Israel and the Palestinians shifts and evolves over time and despite the religious fixations they have , they do respond to the policies Israel and the west are taking."

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-do-palestinians-want

Palestinian leaders may make tactical pivots. This changes nothing about their overall strategic objective: statehood is merely a means to an end. The end is winning the War of Return to right the wrong of Israel's existence as a sovereign state. Statehood alongside Israel is merely part of Arafat's 1988 "stages plan". The most cursory look at The Ask Project interviews and https://palwatch.org shows how this does not become more negotiable due to nuances or changes in Israeli behavior. Try discussing the Pact of Umar with them to see how they view Muslim supremacist dhimmitude as the natural order of things. I've heard this repeatedly in Ask Project interviews. Until UNRWA is dismantled and its inherited status refugees renounce that status and explicitly and publicly recognize in writing and on video that home is where they live now and 1948 is irreversible, no two state solution will be viable. This step is the sine qua non of de-jihadification, breaking the authoritarian collectivist bonds of the death and martyrdom cult. This part of the WI article is particularly delusional:

"When it comes to the two-state solution, the clear divergence in Palestinian popular attitudes between short-term tactical pragmatism and long-term maximalism presents policymakers with both an opportunity and a big challenge. The polling shows receptiveness in Gaza to practical U.S. economic interventions...when policymakers advocate a two-state “land for peace,” they should remember to plan for practical steps that could foster goodwill, or at least nonviolent coexistence, until the parties come closer to compromise on the contours of lasting peace.."

This is like thinking that increasing family welfare payments in 1941 Osaka or Frankfurt would have cured Japanese and German racial supremacists of their Bushido and Lebensraum diseases. Only defeat was the cure then and only explicit recognition by Palestinians that 1948 is irreversible and there will be no return and they're not refugees will allow land for peace negotiations to succeed.

Again, the fantasy of "practical steps" a generation after Shimon Peres' "constructive ambiguity" ("peacemaking, like lovemaking is best made partially in the dark") hypothesis has been proven wrong, is just an obstacle to building a viable "constructive specificity" strategy that must put de-jihadification and refugee status renunciation FIRST, not last. This WI article from 2021, like Mookie's thesis, is just more proof that the American foreign policy blob in Washington learns nothing from past policy failures.